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A B S T R A C T
Human rights have become a salient topic in fisheries governance. There is an increasing call to operationalize
human rights principles in management practices. Enthusiastically, human rights-related language has pro-
liferated in policy texts and academic discourses, but seldom with precise understanding. This deficiency can
create confusion and conflation on-the-ground, and is likely nowhere more pertinent than at the intersection of
human rights and fishing rights with both converging on the application of rights. By applying a legal, applied
perspective, this paper advances two aims. First, it distinguishes and clarifies key terms involved in a human
rights-based approach, including human right, customary fishing right and constitutionally protected right to
fish. Secondly, it exposes dilemmas that can arise when human rights and fishing rights are brought together in
situations of rights allocation, that is, universality of human rights vs. exclusivity of fishing rights; rights versus
attendant duties; prioritizing amongst competing human-cum-fishing rights; and individual vs. communal rights.
Together, we submit that the human rights-based approach to fisheries will be most effective when a human
rights-based approach is used to support (1) communal fishing rights rather than individual rights, assuming the
community strives to ensure the basic dignity of all members by distributing fishing rights in a manner consistent
with human rights principles, and (2) the fishing rights of small-scale fisheries against those of larger industrial
fleets, rather than using it between two small-scale fishing groups. We illustrate these essential clarifications by
drawing on contemporary examples from the Global South and North.
1. Introduction
Human rights and the attendant human rights-based approach (the
“HRBA”) have become a salient topic in fisheries management, con-
servation and seafood discussions in recent years [1–5]. The United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's (the “FAO”) introduction
of the Voluntary Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries
in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication (the “SSF Guide-
lines”) in 2014 [6], which draws on human rights standards as its
guiding precepts, has encouraged all fisheries stakeholders to seek a
practical understanding of the HBRA (see [7,8]). Translating human
rights principles into action appears a crucial step for ensuring the basic
dignity of fishery-dependent people around the world and promoting
their empowerment to achieve sustainable and equitable fishing live-
lihoods.
While great enthusiasm has gathered around the HRBA and the use
of human rights language, we argue that there remain notable con-
ceptual ambiguities, which, if not made explicit with adequate discus-
sion, may hinder our collective ability to implement HRBA within
fisheries. In other words, notwithstanding other important factors that
could impede progress (e.g., lack of administrative and cognitive ca-
pacities, insufficient political will, and policy incoherence, see for ex-
ample [8,9]), practical efforts to implement HRBA may also run
aground because the inherent contradictions within concepts may go
unnoticed and stay unresolved throughout its application. This paper
focuses on illuminating the nuanced linkages that exist between the
notions of fishing rights and human rights. Questions we examine here
are: how should human rights be presented in the context of fishing
rights? Will HRBA enable a better protection of fishing rights for all
small-scale fishers? Can the rights to fish really be a type of human
rights?
Recent claims have tended to emphasize synergy between fishing
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rights and human rights (i.e., “Fishing Rights Are Human Rights”, see
[10,11]). This encouraging sentiment arises out of the rejection of the
so-called “rights-based” approach, in which fishing rights are privatized
and individuated to become an ownership-based, tradable commodity
(e.g., Individual Transferable Quotas, ITQs) and therefore serving as a
neoliberal basis for few, select right-holders’ wealth accumulation [12].
The framing of seeing fishing rights as human rights is thus purposeful
and effective to remind us that the rights of small-scale fishers to access
and harvest fishery resources are, in many cases, a fundamental and
indivisible part of their culture, survival, and wellbeing, which ought
not be capitalized, sold, and otherwise removed from their social-his-
torical contexts. Furthermore, equating fishing rights to human rights
implies that fishing rights are integral to fishers for provision of food,
income and nutrition as well as pride and a sense of place for them-
selves. In other words, fishing rights support fishers' right to food and
right to decent work, among other rights, which all fall under the broad
umbrella notion of “human rights.” Indeed, understanding fishing
rights as integral to fishers' human rights would provide a strong
rhetoric to fend off the socio-economic exclusion and marginalization
undergirded by the prevailing trend of ‘propertization’ of fishing rights
[12,13].
Despite the normative appeal of this assertion, such synergistic (and
simplistic) connection between fishing rights and human rights at the
conceptual level, let alone in practice, is not likely evident. Others have
alluded to this possible inconsistency but without any focused ex-
planation (e.g., see [7]). The purpose of this paper is then to elucidate
the untidy connections between the notions of human rights and fishing
rights. We highlight four areas of potential contradictions that need to
be considered when embarking on a practical quest of strengthening
small-scale fishers’ basic fishing rights through HRBA.
In the remainder of this paper, we first proceed to unpack the
meaning of ‘human rights’ and ‘fishing rights’, followed by an ex-
amination of HRBA to clarify its premise and potential. Next, we de-
scribe the four areas of critical consideration in the course of bringing
fishing and human rights together – namely, exclusivity versus uni-
versality, rights and duties, competing rights, and individual versus
communal rights. We conclude by reflecting on these nuanced inter-
pretations and suggesting ways to advance HBRA for securing small-
scale fishing rights.
2. Unpacking human rights, fishing rights and human rights-
based approach to fisheries
2.1. What are human rights?
As a point of departure, it is helpful to differentiate between con-
stitutional rights (or sometime called civil rights) and human rights.
Constitutional rights are the rights that citizens in a state have because
that state has granted these rights to them. Examples of these rights
include, but are not limited to, equal protection under the law, due
process, and the right against self-incrimination. By comparison, human
rights are the most fundamental rights, that is, universal privileges that
all human beings possess. They include, but are not limited to, the right
to life, the right to protection from torture, the right to a fair trial as
well as the right to education and freedom of expression. Generally,
human rights recognize the inherent value of each person, regardless of
one's background, residency or system of belief, and are based upon the
principles of dignity, equality, and mutual respect.
Although constitutional rights and human rights overlap, the for-
mation of constitutional rights preceded human rights. The United
Nations (UN) only formalized human rights after World War II when it
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the “UDHR”) in 1948
[14]. Subsequently, the UN has put forward several other relevant
conventions to further build on the UDHR, such as the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted in 1966, en-
tered into force in 1976) [15]; the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (adopted in 1979, entered into
force in 1981) [16]; and the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development
[17]. Additionally, the UN drafted and adopted many other declara-
tions whose objectives are to protect a range of universal human rights,
such as the right of self-determination, the rights of indigenous peoples
and minorities, the rights of women, the rights of the child, the rights of
persons with disabilities, the right to marriage, the right to work and to
fair conditions of employment, the rights of migrants, as well as the
right to be free from slavery, slavery-like practices and forced labour
[18].
Although the UDHR and other human rights declarations are not
legally binding, most national constitutions have adopted them in one
way or another. Some states amended their constitutions to incorporate
the UDHR (e.g., Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms is entrenched in
the Constitution Act, 1982) [19].
2.2. What are fishing rights?
Generally, fishing rights are a permission that a governing or li-
censing body gives to a fisher for that fisher to catch fish or another
aquatic product. A governing or licensing body most often documents
the permission in a written legal instrument, such as a fishing licence.
The licence may be renewable (e.g., annually), revocable (e.g., by a
ministerial decision), and transferable (e.g., transferable quotas or fa-
mily inheritance). One private party can also grant a licence to another
private party (e.g., a private auction house issuing private licence to
sellers) [20].
At other times, the licence to fish is not a written document; rather it
is implied. An implied licence to fish is unwritten; yet, the licensee still
has permission to fish and the law may protect this permission. Implied
licences sometimes arise out of circumstances and sometimes by op-
eration of law [20]. Some rights differ from the typical resource access
rights. For example, ITQs have evolved into a fisheries management
system where a regulating authority establishes a species-specific total
allowable catch (“TAC”). In other words, it establishes a cap on the total
amount of a fish species that fishers may catch. The regulator then is-
sues licences to individuals, which give them a share in the TAC [21].
It is important to note that fishing rights are distinct from a ‘con-
stitutionally protected right to fish’, which many Native groups hold in
countries such as Canada, the United States, and New Zealand (see
section 2.3 below). Fishing rights are also distinct from customary
fishing rights that arise through long-established routines as the latter
may precede creation of more modern fishing regulations and licences.
Post-harvest rights are context-specific. Sometime fishing rights include
post-harvest rights and sometimes they do not. Laws in many jurisdic-
tions often prevent fishers from selling directly to consumers [22].
2.3. What is a constitutionally protected right to fish?
It is courts that most often declare a constitutionally protected right
to fish and they typically declare this right in relation to Aboriginal
communities. There are several instances of courts declaring this right
in Canada, the United States, and New Zealand. Generally, Aboriginal
communities argue that they are entitled to fishing resources because of
their historical use of those resources. If a court finds that such a right
exists, it declares the right lawful and affords it constitutional protec-
tion. In the countries mentioned above, a constitutional framework
exists, to various degrees, to recognize historical fishing rights, such as
Canada's Constitution Act, 1982, which protects Aboriginal rights to fish
for food, social, or ceremonial purposes.
The process for a state's recognition of a constitutional right to fish
is often an expensive, time-consuming, and litigious process. Typically,
they are hard fought battles. The group asserting the right must lobby
their parliament or convince the state's high court of this right, de-
pending on the constitutional framework in such state. Furthermore, in
addition to appealing to the court's conscience, the claimant must
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satisfy a legal test. A legal test is a set of factors a court uses to resolve a
legal matter [23]. Each jurisdiction develops a legal test for recognizing
such rights. In this process, groups may use human rights or HRBA-
inspired arguments to promote their interests.
Translating a fishing right into fishing access is not a foregone
conclusion, however. Once a court recognizes a constitutional right to
fish, a regulator must allocate those rights. As discussed earlier, fishing
access rights are typically in the form of licences and the same is true
for Aboriginal fishing access rights. Aboriginal fishing licences may
have unique restrictions, such as non-transferability outside of the
Aboriginal group who holds the licence. For example, in British
Columbia, Canada, the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences Regulations
prohibit anyone other than the holder of the licence from using it [24].
An important question arises with respect to constitutionally protected
rights to fish: what happens to non-Aboriginal groups who may also
hold legal access to the same or overlapping resource? We discuss
competing rights to fish in section 3.3 below.
2.4. What is HRBA?
The HRBA represents a bridging of ‘development’ and ‘human
rights’ paradigms which were considered two separate spheres until the
late 1980s; traditional development thinking had considered economic
growth to be the complete solution [25]. It was becoming evident,
however, that solely focusing on material deprivation and immediate
needs-based interventions without redressing structural causes of pov-
erty that produce exclusion and inequalities was not effective in re-
solving global injustices and eradicate persistent poverty. The 1986 UN
Declaration on the Right to Development first formally recognized the
significance of HRBA [17], by stating that: “the right to development is
an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and
all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy eco-
nomic, social, cultural, and political development in which all human
rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” Subsequently,
the HRBA establishes the indivisibility of civil, political and socio-
economic rights while also promoting active agency of the vulnerable to
human rights violations and aiming to ensure accountability for pro-
tections and freedoms [26].
Many United Nations agencies and programs have adopted HRBA
over time. In 2003, the United Nations published the Statement of
Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approaches to
Development Cooperation and Programming to help mainstream the HRBA
[27]. The FAO also bases its implementation of the 2012 Voluntary
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and
Forests on the seven mnemonic human rights principles called “PAN-
THER” – participation, accountability, non-discrimination, transpar-
ency, human dignity, empowerment, and the rule of law [28].
An adoption of the HRBA to small-scale fisheries received monu-
mental support through the completion of the SSF Guidelines in 2014
[6], whose explicit integration of HRBA and adherence to international
human rights standards is in itself an innovation in the domain of global
fisheries instruments. The SSF Guidelines include 13 main principles:
human rights and dignity, respect of cultures, non-discrimination,
gender equality, equity and equality, consultation and participation,
rule of law, transparency, accountability, economic, social and en-
vironmental sustainability, holistic and integrated approaches, social
responsibility, feasibility, and social and economic viability. Although
worded differently, these guiding principles for SSF Guidelines overlap
with the other distinctions of human rights mentioned elsewhere, such
as the rights of indigenous peoples and minorities (respect of cultures),
the rights of women (gender equality), and the right to fair conditions
of employment (non-discrimination). They also correlate with all
PANTHER principles [29]. Therefore, one can categorize the SSF
Guidelines as an applied human rights declaration that delineates
human rights within the context of the world's fisheries, highlighting
small-scale fisheries' unique vulnerabilities and offering roadmaps to
help them overcome their challenges.
2.5. How to use HRBA with respect to fishing rights?
Translating a set of human rights principles into policy and decision-
making at country level appears an onerous process so far [7–9] – an
observation also forwarded from the field of international development
whose experiences of operationalizing HRBA are likely the most robust
[25]. Applying the HRBA to fisheries is also complicated by their novel
features: that the multiple aspects of human rights need to be realized
for the holistic improvement of people's lives (civil, political, social,
economic and cultural); that human rights principles needs to be in-
tegrated into all phases of governance processes; and that, in doing so,
the capacities of fishers to claim their rights (as right-holders) and those
of government institutions to meet their obligations (as duty-bearers)
need to be enhanced.
Fishing rights represent a specific domain of practice in the appli-
cation of the HRBA. Fishing rights are a crucial enabler of legitimate
fishing activities and fishing-based livelihoods. Where fishing rights do
not exist or where they are contested, the HRBA could function as a
practical guidance (thus beyond the level of rhetoric) that small-scale
fishers may utilize to secure fishing rights via a legally recognizable and
protected means.
Applying the HRBA to the matter of fishing rights in a technical
sense is likely an intricate undertaking that involves administrative and
legal exchanges. Most often, a group of small-scale fishers arguing for
improved rights will find itself challenging a ministerial decision in
court, as was done in South Africa in mid-2000s, for instance, when a
group of artisanal fishers launched class action litigation against the
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism on the grounds that the
fishing rights allocation policies of the government are inequitable and
discriminatory, and violate the human rights of artisanal fishers in the
country in favor of commercial fishing companies [30]. This is often the
realm of either administrative law (when the group argues that the
minister erred in his decision making for one reason or another) or
constitutional law (when the group is arguing that the law or decision is
unconstitutional). Every legal system has its own process for resolving
either types of challenges along with the legal tests that the parties must
meet. In many cases, there are specialized courts designed to hear
specific challenges. In the case of South Africa, the group launched the
case in both the High Court and the Equality Court, the latter of which
is aimed at giving specific effect to the Equality Clause in the Con-
stitution [30].
The proponents would then utilize the HRBA as a supporting ar-
gument or grounds to fit an element of these tests. For example, when a
group raises arguments that a court or ministerial decision violates the
right to equality, which is most often a constitutionally protected right,
the group would first present their arguments in accordance with their
local laws. They then can point to international human rights declara-
tions, HRBA, and the principles in the SSF Guidelines to support their
position. Although, these instruments are informative and not binding
on courts, their use is nevertheless useful in persuading courts to con-
form with international trends. In the South African case above, the
argument of the fisher group centred on, among others, the claim that
the Minister's failure to define and provide for the artisanal fishers as
per the Marine Living Resources Act of 1998, and the consequences of
this failure on the livelihoods of this fishing community, constitute a
violation of a number of human rights contained in the South African
Constitution, 1996 [31] and the Equality Act, 2000 [32] such as the right
to be recognized, the right to a livelihood and the right to food and
nutrition [30]. Representing a landmark case that brought about an
integration of small-scale fishers in the allocation of fishing rights, an
out-of-court settlement in 2007 resulted in an allocation of interim
rights to small-scale fishers and the government's commitment to de-
veloping a new small-scale fisheries policy (see also [33,34]).
An example from Iceland illustrates a lengthier and a more
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persistent effort to oppose private property regimes and claim back
public rights to resources declared by law (i.e., the Icelandic Fisheries
Management Act, 1990) [35–37]. When two fishermen from the coastal
village of Patreksfjörður were defiant in violating the fishing laws to
protest against the ITQ system that they claim to be inequitable, un-
ethical, unconstitutional and even illegal, the Icelandic Fisheries
Agency filed suit against them. After the decision of the District Court,
and later the Supreme Court, found the fishers guilty, the fishers sub-
mitted the case to the UN Human Rights Committee, who six years later
in 2007 produced a decision. The Committee's decision judged the ITQ
system as discriminatory towards the two fishers on the grounds that
they were compelled to buy fishing rights from others while there are
fishers who were gifted with an initial allotment of quota shares in the
early 1980s [36]. Despite the committee's ruling that Iceland must re-
vise its fisheries management system in accordance with human rights,
the Icelandic government has rejected any radical change to re-
allocating fishing rights. Still, there have been meaningful concessions
won in view of the Human Rights Committee's recommendations and
the mounting public demands to open up access to the fish stocks. The
introduction of a free-entry, non-ITQ small-boat handline season called
“coastal fishing” in 2009, although small in quantity in relation to the
total Icelandic annual fish catch, brought a positive impact on small
coastal communities by revitalizing local boat activities and enhancing
employment in fish processing and service sectors [36]. The accusation
of the UN Human Rights Committee was also widely perceived as a
national embarrassment – especially for a country consistently top-
ranked in widely-applied human development and equality measures,
such as the UN Human Development Index and the Gini Index [37].
As such, the task of securing fishing rights through HRBA can yield
positive outcomes, and the process would be relatively more straight-
forward in a case where the government is being challenged by one
(unified) group of fishers. However, when multiple SSF groups with
different claims, all founded on human rights, compete for access to the
same resource, further challenges arise. In subsequent sections, we
bring these challenges to the fore through our juxtaposition of human
rights and fishing rights and of the slippery interface they together pose.
3. The untidy interface between human rights and fishing rights
3.1. Exclusive versus universal nature of rights
The first conceptual difficulty in directly linking fishing rights and
human rights relates to the competing and non-competing nature of the
two respective rights. Rights tend to imply a certain degree of exclusion
and inequality. The regulator's objective for fishing rights is to differ-
entiate between right-holders and non-right-holders (e.g., licensees and
non-licensees or quota-holders and non-quota-holders), that is to say,
issuance of fishing rights is based on exclusivity. For instance, the
premise of Territorial Use Rights for Fishing (“TURF”) is that some
groups have exclusive privileges associated with a specific area. Unless
we speak of an ‘open-access’ regime in which everyone has the equal
right to fish, the standard practices of a rights-based system places re-
strictions on who can and cannot fish. Hence, allocating rights to re-
sources (who, what, where and how long) is usually a contentious topic
that creates winners and losers. Nevertheless, a broad range of per-
spectives has called for clear and secure fishing rights. These perspec-
tives include communitarians who view fishing rights as a common-
property (e.g. [38]), socialists who view fishing rights as a manifesta-
tion of class struggle against the trends of structural marginalization,
over-commercialization, and scientific modernization in fisheries (e.g.
[1,39]), as well as neoliberals who view fishing rights as a rational
enabler of rights-based management (e.g. [40]). Altogether, assigning
rights to the “right” right-holders has been a dominant theme in fish-
eries, as this issue connects with the broader concerns of resource
conservation, social justice, and food sovereignty.
Contrary to fishing rights, the fundamental premise of human rights
is that they are indivisible, universal and equally applied. By virtue of
being human, everyone is a right-holder and is entitled to a suite of
same human rights. In other words, one's human rights do not, and
should not, exclude another's human rights.
This presents one possibility of a stark contradiction between fishing
rights and human rights. When only a specific set of people possesses
fishing rights (whether through private licenses or communal ‘com-
mons’ management), by definition, this negates the claim that fishing
rights are akin to human rights. Only when a fishery is strictly open-
access, fishing access then becomes universal and impartial, and it
might be possible to imagine fishing rights as a category of human
rights. A comparable argument has been made which illuminates the
“safety-valve” function of open-access by letting the rural poor in
Southern Africa enter lake fisheries with little restriction in periods of
economic stress [41,42]. This is not to say that abolishing fishing rights
to (re)institute open-access is a realistic or desirable proposition in most
fisheries. It would also be unwise to equate fishing rights to human
rights in such a literal and sweeping manner. As mentioned in the
preceding section, certain fishing rights, under special circumstances,
would warrant enhanced protection and restitution. Promoting one's
fishing rights as a matter of human rights would, therefore, be a
worthwhile endeavour to strengthen the claim of marginalized fishing
groups. Despite this admission, we urge fishery stakeholders to re-
cognize this fundamental incongruity when planning and implementing
HRBA to fishing rights allocation. Exclusivity is, however, not the only
conceptual hurdle in the attempt to join these two ideas of rights. In
fact, practising one's right to fish as if it is her human right (as opposed
to ‘equating’ them in a categorical sense) also faces a further logical
challenge, which we describe below.
3.2. Rights and attendant duties
Fishing rights typically demand stewardship and sustainability du-
ties. The idea that rights and duties are requisite to each other is similar
to Gifford Pinchot's conservation ethic and wise-use movement, where
individuals who have harvesting rights also have legal and moral duties
to ensure that they care for and sustainably use the resources they
benefit from [43]. Fishing rights, interpreted broadly, therefore, imply
a socio-legal contract concerning a valuable public good [44–46]. Im-
portant fisheries literature has recognized this relationship. The 1995
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries states: “The right to fish
carries with it the obligation to do so in a responsible manner so as to
ensure effective conservation and management of the living aquatic
resources” (Paragraph 6.1 [47]); Daniel Bromley [48, p. 2] similarly
declared, “[r]ights have no meaning without correlated duties.” Indeed,
fishing rights are revocable privileges gained and justified through
several legitimized means, such as group membership (in the case of
fishing cooperatives), financial prowess (in the case of purchasable or
tradable fishing quotas/permits), historic or habitual usage (in the case
of Indigenous communities or locally-residing fishers), or en-
trepreneurial risk-taking (in the case of newly developing fisheries).
Therefore, they can be withdrawn in most cases if fishing rights holders
do not meet the qualifications including the attendant duties, at least in
theory [49].
By contrast, claiming human rights are not conditioned upon ful-
filling certain duties, let alone duties towards environmental sustain-
ability and stewardship, because of the unnegotiable nature of human
rights. That is, human rights are so basic that they defy being bargained
or conditioned. Dowell-Jones [50, p. 50] admits that “the notion of
human duties – of the capacity of the individual to bear responsibility
for realisation of his/her own rights – is in many ways the forgotten
chapters of the human rights dialogue, a topic on which comparatively
little has been written.” Typically, states are seen as the sole duty
bearers of human rights because states (and by extension supranational
institutions such as the European Union) are the primary political
community that have authority over the right-holders [51,52]. They are
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also the only institution deemed to have the capabilities to perform
both the duties to protect (e.g., the duty to protect people against racial
discrimination) and the duties to provide (e.g., the duty to guarantee the
availability of clean water) [53].
As such, within the human rights tradition, right-holders have no
obligations, aside from refraining from acts that will violate the human
rights of others. Bromley's view, “the management problem with open
access regimes is that there are no duties on aspiring users to refrain
from use” [48, p. 2], speaks directly to the dilemma which we pose
here. Hence, this contradiction about presence or absence of attendant
duties is suggestive of another angle through which it appears proble-
matic to conceive fishing rights as human rights when defining and
practising fishing rights. While human rights serve as a useful impetus
for strengthening the rights of unjustly excluded fishers, uncritical en-
thusiasm about human rights may lead to underemphasization of at-
tendant duties, ultimately to the detriment of resource sustainability.
Specifying responsibilities and duties in a way that is consistent with
resource ethics will be an important challenge left to the oper-
ationalization of HRBA.
3.3. Whose rights matter more?
Further complicating the issue of linking fishing rights and human
rights is the question of reconciling rights claims of more than one
entity. Consider a case of multiple groups competing for the same or
overlapping fishing rights all by way of human rights principles. The
question becomes which groups of fishers should be given precedence
when their fishing rights claims collide. Different communities may
bring forward different human rights-inspired arguments to claim their
right to fish, whether based on economic, social, cultural or moral
reasons. One group may ground their argument on historic use, place
attachment, or long-standing culture (e.g., constitutionally protected
right to fish). Another group comprising tenureless migrants may be
deemed highly vulnerable and demand special consideration to protect
their livelihood needs. Migrant fishers’ concerns might especially grow
in size and relevance as the number of climate change refugees in-
creases [54,55].
The 1999–2002 disputes between the Mi'kmaq community and the
non-native fishers over lobster fishing rights in Miramichi Bay in
Canada are illustrative of this dilemma. Asserting the 1760 Treaty of
Peace and Friendship (the “Treaty”, which proclaimed aboriginal fishing
and hunting rights [56]), the Mi'kmaq demanded a right to enter fishery
freely and fish year-round for subsistence and sale, while the non-native
lobster fishers argued that such allocation would be detrimental to the
conservation of lobster stocks and their own livelihoods, who them-
selves are also small-scale fishers. Spurred by the Supreme Court De-
cision R. v. Marshall and the subsequent clarification referred to as
“Marshall 2”, violent protests and vandalism ensued between native
and non-native fishers. While appearing to uphold the treaty right, the
court decisions ultimately affirmed that the treaty right cannot entirely
supersede the Fisheries Minister's authority to intervene and the gov-
ernment's power to regulate. The process to resolution was not without
standoffs and high tension. Notably, both parties relied on human rights
arguments. Non-native fishers were demanding that native and non-
native alike should be treated equally under the law with the same
rights and the same system of fishing rules [57]. The Mi'kmaq people
drew on more explicit human rights languages, such as their inherent
rights to fish (as opposed to the treaty-based rights that actually had to
be confirmed by the Supreme Court) and submitting their ordeal as the
“best case of an abuse of human rights” (quoted in [58, p. 180]). The
conflict officially ended when the parties reached an agreement, with
the government offering material concessions to native fishers in ex-
change for their acceptance of a centralized system of licences and
fishing rules. Hereditary Chief of the Mi’Kmaq Grand Council, however,
expressed indignation by declaring the agreement to be an outcome of
structural coercion. Once again by appealing to the conscience of
human rights, he stated, “The UN Human Rights Committee has ruled
that the extinguishment of our aboriginal and treaty rights is violation
of fundamental human rights … Peace cannot arise out of injustice and
no ‘certainty’ can result from the imposing of an unequal agreement.
The Crown, and Canadians, will get no lasting benefit from these ‘deals’
involving the annihilation of our rights, except the despair and re-
sentment of generations of our children and people” [59].
When different parties attempt to secure their fishing rights by re-
lying on human rights-based arguments, we contend that this can
weaken the merit of employing the HRBA. This is because, at the most
basic level, human rights defy prioritization. What should receive pre-
cedence between, for instance, ‘equality and non-discrimination’ for
non-native small-scale fishers and ‘justice and self-determination’ for
the native community? In fact, they are all important. Hence, in the
context of conflicting rights claims between different groups of small-
scale fishers, resorting to human rights arguments may not necessarily
confer an advantage, while likely giving rise to messy, antagonistic
(legal) battles. This conceptual uncertainty exposes another possible
conundrum in implementing HRBA in fishing rights allocation. We
provide further reflection and a potential way forward in the discussion
section below.
3.4. Individual versus communal rights
Finally, even when a community has successfully applied the HRBA
to secure their communal fishing rights, it is still unknown whether
each individual fisher would receive adequate entitlement. Individual
entitlement matters because, historically, the human rights paradigm
has favoured individualistic orientation – to account for every person
and aim that everyone is subject to equal and just treatment regardless
of her social standing and political membership; it links well with the
widely-recognized human development slogan of “leaving no one be-
hind” (see [60]). Subsequently, this might mean that the HRBA as ap-
plied to the allocation of fishing rights has a similar endpoint, i.e., to
have every qualified fisher or fishing household be secured with a right
to benefit from her fishing work. On the contrary, discussion on HRBA
to fisheries has tended to gravitate towards emphasizing the commu-
nity-level as a site of HRBA implementation [1,61,62]. This latter view
reflects the embedded nature of SSF in the values and traditions of local
communities where fishing is not only an individual pursuit but also a
collective endeavour situated within group norms. The community
angle is unmistakable, though at times implicit, in many notable writ-
ings on this topic.
The potential danger in privileging the collective rights claims of
fishing communities is that the group rights secured through human
rights principles may nevertheless fail to guarantee the human rights of
individual members. There may be context-specific, culturally-dis-
tinctive within-group dynamics that tolerate episodes of gender in-
equality, power imbalances, and lack of transparency in decision-
making as well as unequal distribution of resource use rights among
members (e.g., local elite capture). Moreover, community leadership
may neither assume nor is required to be the duty-bearer of human
rights, that is, there may be no codified obligation on their part to treat
every member with equal respect, participation and sensitivity. As a
result, individuals in possession of substantial authority, know-how, or
financial capital such as community leaders, aquaculturists, or simply
more established fishers may reap bigger shares of the benefit at the
expense of other members in the community (see [63,64]). Therefore,
the pitfall of such group-focus leaves open the question of within-group
discrimination. For instance, halibut and sablefish fisheries in the Gulf
of Alaska allows a Community Quota Entity (CQE) program where
eligible communities through their local non-profit organizations can
purchase quota shares which are then leased to community residents. In
this case, the overarching CQE program does not mandate any uniform
standard specifying how each community should make quota allocation
decisions within itself, that is, each community is free to devise
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allocation rules in any manner that it deems as efficient and necessary
[65, p.307]. A further concern arises because beyond civil actions that
can be taken against community organizations, or attacks on the gen-
eral application and approval process at the federal level, Soliman [65,
p.308] notes that there is no appeal process that can be used to contest
the decisions of the board regarding whether or not quota share will be
allocated to a particular resident. In the same vein, withholding the
fishing right of a younger resident or a new entrant to the fishery, until
they fulfill a prerequisite number of years or minimum fishing days as
prescribed in community membership rules, may also unduly deprive
these less established fishers of an opportunity to work and make a
viable living. In South Korea, the membership rules vary by fishing
village cooperatives where some impose high membership joining fees
or even require fishers to hold a title to a house in the community [66].
In most cases, those excluded are at the mercy of such within-group
dynamics and have few other options but to abide by local regulations
in order to be accepted and benefit from the community's right to fish.
Despite such concerns, experiences tell us that applying the HRBA at
the level of individual fisher would not constitute a viable strategy ei-
ther. Focusing on the individuals and their independent rights to fish
may mean that communal rights are further eroded and community
identity dissipated, as a privatized and rationalized fishing sector has
repeatedly worked to damage the social fabric of fishing communities
[67,68]. Especially, the use of ITQs in many parts of the world has
increased concentration and monopolization of quota shares in larger
and wealthier commercial entities at the risk of forcing smaller owner-
operator fishers or crew members to leave the fishery and even the
locality altogether for seeking livelihoods elsewhere [67,69,70]. In
short, applying the HRBA to allocation of fishing rights can either ad-
vance community entitlements as a whole but may not necessarily help
all individuals in the community, or it can promote individual's rights
discretely but put community integrity and functioning in peril. The
realisation that HRBA may not achieve both community and individual
benefits harmoniously and simultaneously forms an additional re-
minder of the untidy linkage that arise in the convergence of human
rights and fishing rights.
4. Discussion: A way forward
Human rights discourse now experiences widespread usage in many
sectors of our society, from international law, development and politics
to natural resource governance – including the field of fisheries and
aquaculture more recently. It has become the basic normative currency
for addressing political, social, and economic injustices and insecurity
[51]. When we call something a human right, we are claiming that it is
of grave concern and deserving utmost priority in reasoning and action.
Human rights-based arguments can therefore bring an added urgency
towards securing small-scale fishing rights “as part of a wider mission
for self-determination and equal rights as citizens” [2, p. 20]. Yet, there
is a danger of devaluation and indifference, too, if the language of
human rights proliferate but fails to underpin practical decisions. As the
greatest emancipatory potential lies not in the rhetoric but in its ap-
plication – here, in the infusion of human rights standards into the
decisions of rights allocation, we will likely see an increasing need for,
and use of, human rights-based arguments to support the urgent, con-
troversial and critical cases of fishing rights claims.
The purpose of this article was, therefore, to assist the application of
the HRBA by highlighting four conceptual hurdles between human
rights and fishing rights that, if not adequately made aware of, could
confound legal and regulatory procedures and frustrate on-ground al-
location outcomes. Importantly, because we do not expect clear-cut
solutions to these incongruities, this article suggests that the process of
fishing rights claim via human rights principles may be punctuated with
hard choices on the part of regulators and judiciaries and undue win-
ners and losers on the part of fishing groups. Based on our analysis,
however, we offer two ways forward in terms of alleviating this
dilemma. First, we reason that applying the HRBA to the allocation of
fishing rights will be most effective when the human rights principles
are used to promote communal rights rather than individual rights in-
sofar as groups are motivated to ensure the basic dignity of all members
by distributing fishing rights in a manner consistent with the human
rights standards. In the Alaskan example, the Old Harbor's CQE has
created a distribution system that is meant to be equitable, accountable,
and achieves the community's goal of providing opportunities for both
long-established residents and new entrants [65]. This was to be
achieved, for instance, through setting aside 20% of leases for in-
experienced community residents with limited resources (e.g., small-
boat fishers) to reduce barriers to entry and by limiting the number of
leases per household to two to ensure that the benefits of the program
are spread throughout the community [65, p. 312].
Second, we advise the HRBA to focus on strengthening the fishing
rights of SSF against the claims of larger, wealthier and more privileged
fishing entities, rather than using it between SSF groups. The South
African example described earlier was the case of pitting the rights of a
group of artisanal fishers against the rights of larger and more estab-
lished commercial operators, who were also predominantly white (see
[30,33,34]). Our view is that because of the clear disparity between the
two groups in terms of their scale, rationale and modus operandi, the
human rights-based arguments formulated for small-scale fishers likely
gained greater conviction and possibly became more impactful. Thus,
prioritizing SSF against large-scale fisheries, instead of adjudicating
between two or more groups all characterized as SSF, would represent
the least problematic and most persuasive linkage that human rights
have to fishing rights. A related question is: should the HRBA also apply
to large-scale fisheries? The blatant violations of human rights such as
at-sea slavery and human trafficking suggests a clear role of the HRBA
in the large-scale fishing sector [71,72]. However, when it comes to
fishing rights allocation, we submit that the HRBA would lose much of
its potency and purpose if it were to be aimed at securing the economic
interests of large-scale fisheries. Such affirmative action in prioritizing
the needs of the most marginalized and the vulnerable is indeed a basic
tenet of the HRBA [1,8,61,73].
The practical quest of securing the fishing rights of small-scale
fishers does not happen overnight and would require well-guided effort
in assisting and empowering communities through creating alliances
with legal practitioners, human rights commissions and/or non-
governmental organizations. The government, too, must not only focus
on the outcomes of the HRBA as it would try to adapt to the new al-
location decisions, but also respect and meet the human rights re-
quirements embedded in procedures. Relevant questions in this respect
are (for details, see [8, p. 783]) – are fishing communities being ade-
quately consulted? Can they freely express their views without fear and
shame? Are they allowed and encouraged to assemble and organize to
influence decisions that matter to them? Is information being provided
in forms and language understandable to them? Is there a mechanism in
place to deal with grievances and are there options for recourse to
appeals?
Fishing rights are a crucial and legitimized means to ensure a bundle
of human rights for communities of fishworkers. Reciprocally, the
HRBA is needed for the process of (re)allocating fishing rights to secure
the basic rights of those most marginalized and vulnerable. We argue
that it is this nuanced and circuitous connection that allows us to go
past the simple rhetoric of equating fishing rights to human rights and
chart out the conceptual contradictions as well as their mutually-sup-
porting functions. Critical consideration will bring more meaningful
contribution. Intricacies of these concepts further call for care and
sensitivity in implementation, an important reminder for realizing
human-cum-fishing rights to benefit the world's small-scale fisheries.
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